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Abstract
We present a statistical model for voter choice that incorporates a consideration set stage and
final vote intention stage. The first stage involves a multivariate probit model for the vector
of probabilities that a candidate or a party gets considered. The second stage of the model
is a multinomial probit model for the actual choice. In both stages we use as explanatory
variables data on voter choice at the previous election, as well as socio-demographic respondent
characteristics. Importantly, our model explicitly accounts for the three types of “missing data”
encountered in polling. First, we include a no-vote option in the final vote intention stage.
Second, the “do not know” response is assumed to arise from too little difference in the utility
between the two most preferred options in the consideration set. Third, the “do not want to
say” response is modelled as a missing observation on the most preferred alternative in the
consideration set. Thus, we consider the missing data generating mechanism to be non-ignorable
and build a model based on utility maximization to describe the voting intentions of these
respondents. We illustrate the merits of the model as we have information on a sample of about
5000 individuals from the Netherlands for who we know how they voted last time (if at all),
which parties they would consider for the upcoming election, and what their voting intention
is. A unique feature of the data set is that information is available on actual individual voting
behavior, measured at the day of election. We find that the inclusion of the consideration set
stage in the model enables the user to make more precise inferences on the competitive structure
in the political domain and to get better out-of-sample forecasts.
Key words: Choice model, Probit model, Election data, Polling, Bayesian method
1 INTRODUCTION
Modeling and forecasting voter choice is a key topic in the political science literature. The models
may lead to an understanding of the determinants of voting behavior, while the forecasts based on
these models can for example be used to modify campaign strategies. Given the use of the models
for such an important topic, it should not come as a surprise that there is abundant literature on
the design and implementation of models for voter choice. For example, a recent special issue
of the International Journal of Forecasting (1999, volume 15, issue 2) contained a variety of
articles on models that can be useful to predict the outcomes of elections. Typically, the models
take stated intentions, previous choice and voter-specific characteristics as explanatory variables,
where the data can be available at the individual voter level or at a certain level of aggregation.
Techniques that are commonly used range from the familiar multinomial logit and probit models
for individual data to ecological inference methods for grouped data.
The overall conclusion from the literature is that there is no single method that is to be
preferred as it outperforms all other methods. There may be various reasons why predictions
turn out to be wrong or inaccurate. One reason may be that the forecasting methodology itself
is inadequate. Another reason may be that in between elections, and perhaps also in the period
in between stated intentions and final elections, economic or other conditions change, see Fair
(1996). Note that this possibility touches upon the very nature of forecasting, which is that it
is usually assumed that the past can somehow be extrapolated into the future. A third possible
reason for inaccurate predictions, which has received quite some attention recently, concerns the
individuals who state not to know who to vote for or who intend not to vote at all, as discussed
in particular by Lynn and Jowell (1996). In fact, Sanders (1998) convincingly shows that any
forecasting model that does not take those individuals into account is misspecified.
There have been various attempts in the political science literature to incorporate the decision
to vote in multinomial choice models, see Dubin and Rivers (1990) and also Sanders (1998),
among others. These models usually contain a model component that can handle only two or
three voting options, preceeded by a component that takes care of the sample selection issue,
that is, the notion that, simply, no vote is observed for those individuals who do not vote. The
currently available models suffer from various drawbacks. The first is that these models are
difficult to extend to the case of (many) more than, say, three voting options, where such a large
amount of options is quite common for several European countries, for example. Additionally,
the models are difficult to extend if one would want to allow for other types of missing data,
which may be generated by individuals who state that they do not know which party or candidate
they would favor, or those individuals who do not want to tell about their voting intentions.
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Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the typical view on non-voters and the like is to treat
these as missing cases, for which one should correct in a second stage of modeling. In other
words, the non-voters cause some form of selection bias for the model of interest. However, as
it is sometimes suggested, see Gilljam and Granberg (1993) and Lynn and Jowell (1996) among
others, it seems worthwhile to examine the behavior of non-voters and try to include the relevant
observations into a forecasting model. Indeed, it may be that non-voters are informative in the
context of a forecasting model, that is, they can have predictive value for the final outcome.
The key problem for the inclusion of non-voters, that is, those who do not know and those
who do not want to say into a forecasting model is of course the fact that there is no answer
to the question concerning the voting intention for these individuals. This may become even
more problematic if the same individual indeed did not vote at the previous election, and perhaps
indeed does not vote at the current election. One may resort to various imputation techniques, see
for example Gelman, King, and Liu (1998) and Gelman and King (1995) for recent approaches
to item nonresponse based on complete and available cases and multiple imputation. However,
another viable strategy may be to ask for additional information in the relevant questionnaire.
For example, one may ask individuals to indicate which parties or candidates they might consider
voting for, and next, one can ask which of these (if at all) would be preferred (see, for example,
Yu and Lam 1997). It is known from the marketing and econometrics literature, see Siddarth,
Bucklin and Morisson (1995) and Chiang, Chib and Narasimhan (1999), that the introduction
of an additional layer in a choice model can lead to better predictions of the actual choice.
Consideration set formation is supported by consumer behavior theory (Bettman 1979), that
indicates that consumers are likely to make decisions from larger sets of alternatives in more
than one stage. Taking this notion to voting behavior, one may also view the voting process
as a multi-stage process, where the final choice is made based on a set of alternatives which is
presumably smaller than the set containing all choice options. Hence, it is of interest to include
questions on consideration sets in the questionnaire, also since these may receive less “do not
know” or “do not want to say” responses. If so, then the information in the consideration set can
have a predictive value for the final choice.
In this paper we present a statistical model for voter choice that incorporates a consideration
set stage and final vote intention stage. The first stage involves a multivariate probit [MVP] model
for the vector of probabilities that a candidate or a party gets considered (Chib and Greenberg
1998, van Nierop et al. 2000). The second stage of the model is a multinomial probit [MNP]
model for the actual choice, see Alvarez and Nagler (1998a, 1998b), Lacy and Burden (1999),
Quinn, Martin, and Whitford (1999) and Schofield, Martin, Quinn and Whitford (1998) for
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other applications of this MNP model in political science. In both stages we use as explanatory
variables data on voter choice at the previous election, as well as socio-demographic respondent
characteristics. Importantly, our model explicitly accounts for the three types of “missing data”
encountered in polling. First, we include a no-vote option in the final vote intention stage.
Second, the “do not know” response is assumed to arise from too little difference in the utility
between the two most preferred options in the consideration set. Third, the “do not want to
say” response is modelled as a missing observation on the most preferred alternative in the
consideration set. Thus, we consider the missing data generating mechanism to be non-ignorable
and build a model based on utility maximization to describe the voting intentions of these
respondents.
In this paper we illustrate the merits of the model as we have information on a sample of
about 5000 individuals from the Netherlands for who we know how they voted last time (if
at all), which parties they would consider for the upcoming election, and what is their voting
intention. A unique feature of the data set is that information is available on actual individual
voting behavior, measured at the day of election. This enables us to validate our approach at the
individual level and to reveal the gain in predictive accuracy relative to a few other individual
level forecasting approaches.
The outline of our paper is as follows. In Section 2 we put forward our two-stage model,
which explicitly incorporates the possibility that individuals “do not vote”, “do not know” or “do
not want to say”. In Section 3 we give a sketch of a Bayesian method for parameter estimation,
where we relegate more technical details to the Appendix. In Section 4 we provide a description
of the data and of the political context in the Netherlands. In Section 5 we report on the empirical
results and we provide a discussion of the main conclusions that can be drawn from these results.
Finally, in Section 6, we conclude our paper with a few remarks.
2 MODEL
2.1 Preliminaries
In this section we propose a two-stage choice model to describe the vote behavior of an individual
i (i = 1; : : : ; I), who faces a choice between J political parties, where we make this behavior
dependent on intentions and considerations. We denote the stated vote intention prior to the
election by the variable d
i
, which can take J + 3 different values. If d
i
= j with j  J the
individual has a single most preferred party. If d
i
= J + 1 the individual does not intend to vote,
while d
i
= J +2 indicates that the individual does not know yet and d
i
= J +3 indicates that the
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individual does not want to say his or her vote intention. Individuals are assumed not to consider
all parties in their decision process, but to choose one party from a particular subset of the parties
at a particular point in time. This consideration or choice set may contain any combination of
available parties. Hence, for each individual there are Q = 2J potential consideration sets. Note
that an individual may have an empty consideration set, which implies that he or she does not
consider any party at all. In that case the outcome of the voting intention d
i
may be “do no vote”
(J + 1) or “do not know yet” (J + 2) or even “do not want to say” (J + 3).
2.2 Two-stage Model
The goal of this paper is to construct a choice model for the vote intention of the individuals
stated prior to the elections and to use this model to predict the actual vote of the individuals at
the election. The model we propose consists of two components. In the first stage we describe
the consideration set of an individual. In the second stage we model the actual choice among the
parties in the consideration set of this individual.
Consideration set formation The stated consideration set of an individual i, c
i
, can be
represented by a J-dimensional vector containing binary variables
c
i
=
0
B
@
c
i1
.
.
.
c
iJ
1
C
A
; (1)
where c
ij
= 1 if party j is in the consideration set of individual i, and 0 otherwise, see van Nierop
et al. (2000) for a similar approach. To describe the inclusion of a party in the consideration set
of an individual i, we use a multivariate probit model [MVP]
C

ij
= x
0
i

j
+ I[d
 1
i
= j] + "
ij
; j = 1; : : : ; J; (2)
where C
ij
is the latent variable modeling the inclusion, x
i
is a k-dimensional vector of
explanatory variables including for example age and gender, 
j
a k-dimensional parameter vector
and "
ij
is a disturbance term. The term I[d 1
i
= j] is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the actual
vote of the individual in the previous election is party j and zero elsewhere. The parameter 
therefore models the effect of state-dependence.
Party j enters the consideration set of individual i, that is c
ij
= 1, if C
ij
> 0. The probability
that this party is included depends on the distribution of "
ij
. We assume that the vector of
disturbances "
i
= ("
i;1
; : : : ; "
i;J
)
0 is normally distributed, that is,
"
i
 N(0;): (3)
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The parameters in the model are theoretically identified if we restrict one of the diagonal
elements of  to be 1. In our empirical illustration below, it turns out that the cross restriction
of the state-dependence parameter  across the equations is not strong enough for empirical
identification and hence we impose the restriction that the diagonal elements of  are all equal to
1.
Party choice Given the consideration set of individual i, we describe his or her party choice by
a multinomial probit model. An individual chooses among the parties in his or her consideration
set. Additionally, we assume that an individual may always decide not to vote at all and hence
we impose that c
i;J+1
= 1 for all i. Individual i perceives utilities D
ij
, for j = 1; : : : ; J +1, with
c
ij
= 1, from voting for party j or for not voting (J + 1), that is,
D

ij
= x
0
i

j
+ I[d
 1
i
= j]Æ + 
ij
; for j = 1; : : : ; J + 1 with c
ij
= 1; (4)
where x
i
is again a k-dimensional vector of explanatory variables, 
i
is a k-dimensional parameter
vector and 
ij
is a disturbance term. The Æ parameter describes again state-dependence. For
identification purposes we impose that 
J+1
equals zero. Note that the explanatory variables may
affect the consideration set membership and the choice in a different way.
We assume that individual i states to vote on party j (d
i
= j) if the perceived utility of voting
on party j is more than  larger than the perceived utilities for voting for the other parties in the
consideration set or for not voting. Hence, we assume that
D

ij
> D

il
+  for l = 1; : : : ; j   1; j + 1; J + 1jc
il
= 1: (5)
An individual i does not vote (d
i
= J + 1) if the perceived utility of not voting is more than 
higher than the perceived utilities of the parties in the consideration set, that is,
D

i;J+1
> D

il
+  for l = 1; : : : ; J jc
il
= 1: (6)
To describe the utility structure of individuals who do not know yet (d
i
= J + 2), we consider
the maximum of the perceived utilities in the consideration set and the “no vote” option
D

i;max = max(D

ij
; j = 1; : : : ; J + 1jc
ij
= 1) (7)
and the value of the second largest perceived utility
D

i;max 1 = max(D

ij
; j = 1; : : : ; J + 1jc
ij
= 1 ^ j 6= max): (8)
We assume that individual i states not to know which party to vote (j = J + 2) if the difference
between the two largest perceived utilities is smaller than or equal to , that is,
D

i;max  D

i;max 1 + : (9)
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Note that, as such, an individual may also exercise doubt between voting and non-voting. Finally,
an individual may also not want to say the voting intention (d
i
= J + 3). In this case we do not
impose any restrictions on the perceived utilities.
The probabilities of the outcome of the voting intention depend on the distributional
assumptions on 
ij
. We assume that the vector of the disturbances 
i
= (
i1
; : : : ; 
iJ
)
0 is normally
distributed, that is,

i
 N(0;
): (10)
Although Keane (1992) shows that the off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix in a
multinomial probit [MNP] model are empirically identified if we have a parameter that is the
same across the J+1 equations, it turns out to be that the cross restriction on the state-dependence
parameter Æ parameter is again not strong enough for empirical identification. Hence, we assume
that 
 is a diagonal matrix and impose that 

J+1;J+1
= 1 for theoretical identification.
3 ESTIMATION AND FORECASTING
3.1 Estimation
To estimate the model parameters in our two-stage model, we consider the likelihood function
for the stated considerations and party choices of the individuals, c = fc
i
; i = 1; : : : ; Ig,
d = fd
i
; i = 1; : : : ; Ig, that is,
L(c; dj) =
I
Y
i=1
Pr[d
i
jc
i
; ; Æ; ;
]Pr[c
i
j; ;]; (11)
where  = (; ;; ; Æ; ;
) with  = (
1
: : : 
J
) and  = (
1
: : : 
J
). The likelihood function
involves the product of the probability that the consideration set of individual i is c
i
and the
probability that the party choice is d
i
given c
i
for all individuals, and thus for a given individual
the product of a multivariate and a multinomial probit probability.
To estimate the model parameters  we opt for a Bayesian approach. We assume a flat
prior distribution for the model parameters  and use the Gibbs sampling approach of Geman
and Geman (1984) to obtain posterior results. In each step of the Gibbs sampler, we draw the
model parameters , , 
, , Æ,  and  from their full conditional posterior distribution. The
unobserved utilitiesD
ij
and C
i
are sampled alongside the model parameters (data augmentation),
see Tanner and Wong (1987). For details on a Gibbs sampling approach in multivariate and
multinomial probit models, we refer to Albert and Chib (1993), McCulloch and Rossi (1994),
Chib and Greenberg (1998), and McCulloch, Polson and Rossi (2000). In the Appendix we
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provide a short outline of the derivations of the full posterior distributions of the model parameters
and unobserved utilities.
3.2 Forecasting
The goal of this paper is to model the vote intention of individuals prior to the election and to
use the estimated model to predict the actual voting behavior of the individuals in the upcoming
election. As we are dealing with choice models, we obtain the predictive probabilities for all
possible realizations of d
i
given x
i
and the actual vote in the previous election. These predictive
probabilities are given by
Pr[d
i
] =
Z

Pr[d
i
jc
i
; ; Æ; ;
]Pr[c
i
j; ;]p(jdata)d; (12)
where we integrate with respect to the posterior distribution of , denoted by p(jdata), to deal
with parameter uncertainty.
These predictive probabilities can easily be computed using the Gibbs output. For each draw
of  we generate C
ij
according to (2) for j = 1; : : : ; J . The latent C
ij
provides us a consideration
set for each individual and given these consideration sets we generate utilities D
ij
according to
(4). The party choices for each draw are determined according to the rules given above. The
relative frequencies of the choices provide the predictive probabilities, where we use the stated
intentions for those subjects for which those are available. If the vote intention is unknown, we
use our model and parameter estimates to predict the vote. In forecasting, we do not reweight the
sample. We are not interested in forecasts of the outcomes “does not want to say” and “does not
know”, but we are in forecasting the option not to vote. In that case the choice simply corresponds
to the largest utility.
4 BACKGROUND AND DATA DESCRIPTION
In this section we first discuss the political context of the Netherlands and next we provide some
details on the data.
4.1 Political Context
The political context in this paper concerns the Dutch 1994 parliament elections. Every four
years, the electorate in The Netherlands chooses a new parliament, consisting of 150 members.
The number of representatives of each of the political parties in the parliament is simply
determined by the share of votes for a certain party. Shifts in the preference distribution can have
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substantial political consequences. To form the government a coalition of two or more parties has
to represent 50% or more of the voters. Currently the four important political parties are CDA
(Christian Democrats), D’66 (Democrats), PvdA (Social Democrats), and VVD (Liberals). The
government of The Netherlands has formed a coalition between two or three of these four parties
for the past several decades. At the 1989 elections, close to 90% of the votes were for these four
parties. Pre-election polls, conducted by several market research agencies in the Netherlands, are
used by the parties (amongst others) to investigate with which parties they can and would like to
form a coalition and serve as the basis for modifying campaign strategies.
4.2 Data
Our data were collected by the market research agency Inter/View in April and June 1994
(elections were held in June 1994). We are interested in forecasting the election outcomes for
the four major parties, CDA (j = 1), PvdA (j = 2), VVD (j = 3) and D’66 (j = 4). We
combine the other parties into one “Other party”(j = 5) category. In addition, we include the
“Do not know” (j = 7), category and the “No vote” (j = 6) category. Finally, there is a small
fraction of the respondents who do not want to say for which party they intend to vote. We add
a separate category for this group. The data concern four (sets of) variables. We have the stated
consideration set of individual i denoted by c
i
, with c
i
a J-dimensional 0=1 vector. Next, we
have the stated party choice d
i
, with d
i
= j for j  J indicating a single most preferred party,
j = J + 1 indicating that the individual does not want to vote, j = J + 2 indicating that the
individual does not yet know, and j = J + 3 indicating that the individual does not want to say.
As explanatory variables, individual-specific socio-economic and demographic variables
are contained in the k-dimensional vector x
i
. Based on previous literature (Schofield et al.
1998, Swank and Eisinga 1999) and preliminary analyses we selected the following seven
explanatory variables, that is, Looking for a job (1=yes, 0=no), Home ownership (1=own
house, 0=rental house), Gender (1=female, 0=male), Dwelling (1=countryside, 2=urbanized
countryside, 3=small town, 4=city), Income (1=below modal, 2=modal, 3=above modal), Age
(1=age  34, 2=34 < age  54, 3=age > 55), and Labor union membership (1=FNV, 2=CNV
(Christian union), 3=Other, 4=none).
The actual voting behavior in 1989 is used as a predictor variable and enables us to assess
state-dependence. Finally, we have the actual behavior in 1994, that is, the party that has been
voted for at the election day in June 1994, assessed by a telephone interview among the sample
on the day after the election. This variable is used for identifying the predictive validity of our
approach.
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We believe this stated voting behavior to be the best yardstick available for validation in the
absence of the option of retrieving the real votes. The bias relative to actual vote behavior is
expected to be small given its measurement right after the elections.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Data
Table 1 summarizes the actual votes in 1989, the intentions in 1994, the consideration set 1994,
the actual votes in 1994, as well as a cross-tabulation of the vote intention variable with the
explanatory variables.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
A noticeable figure is that about 10% of the 4620 individuals does not vote in 1994.
The profile of the political parties is as expected CDA (Christian democrats) seems to attract
the home-owning, countryside-situated, modal-income earning, older respondents. D’66
(democrats) seems to represent home owners living in urban areas with above-modal wages.
PvdA-voters (socialists) rent houses, have below-modal incomes, and are highly represented in
the FNV (a socialist union). The VVD (liberals) appear to be home owners with high incomes.
It is of some interest to consider the profiles of the no-vote category, the do not know category,
and the do not want to say category. The no-voters seem to belong to the young, renting, modal
income category. This category could consider politics to be something quite distinct from their
own interests. The “do not know” category is large and also shows a mixed profile. It is, however,
noteworthy that in particular females have doubts for which party to vote. Finally, the “do not
want to say” category does not have a particularly clear profile.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 2 displays a cross-tabulation of the intended and actual vote. Only for 2289 (49.5%) of
the individuals, the vote intention is the same as their actual vote, which may be considered as a
rather low number. Additionally, 81% of the individuals who state that they will vote for PVDA
will actually vote for PVDA. For CDA and VVD, this percentage is about 76%, while for D’66
it is only 61%. For the individuals who do not know what to vote (1289), PVDA (290 votes) and
CDA (253 votes) are the most popular parties, while the other parties are roughly equally popular.
5 RESULTS AND COMPARISONS
Next to the two-stage model presented above, we estimate three simplified versions of it. The
first, which we label model A, is a multinomial probit model for the stated vote intention. In this
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model we use no consideration set information and omit all individuals i with d
i
> 5. Note that
this model does not predict the “no vote” option. In model B we include the options “no vote”,
“do not know” and “do not want to say”. Hence in this model we have 6 choice categories (5
parties plus no vote), and the two remaining options are modelled as described in Section 2.2.
This model describes and predicts the option “no vote” explicitly. The third model, model C, is
again an extended version of the previous model. We include state-dependence with the dummy
of party choice in 1989. As we do not have an actual vote for every individual in 1989, we include
three extra explanatory dummy variables which take on the value 1 if the individual answered “do
not know” (do not recall), “no vote”, or “do not want to say”, respectively. The fourth model,
labeled model D, is our full-fledged two-stage model, in which we use the consideration sets
knowledge and allow for all options, including state-dependence. In this case we use 2 methods
for prediction, both of which use stated party intentions if available. The difference is in the use
of the consideration set knowledge for respondents with j > 5. With the first method (D1) we
predict the consideration sets for these respondents. Alternatively, in the second method (D2),
we use stated consideration sets, unless the consideration set is unknown for a certain individual,
in which case we predict it.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
[Insert Table 4 about here]
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The posterior means and posterior standard deviations of the model parameter of the
two-stage model are given in Tables 3–5. Table 3 shows that the posterior means of the parameters
capturing the effects of the explanatory variables on the consideration sets are much farther
away from zero than twice their posterior standard deviations. Importantly, the state-dependence
parameter  is positive and highly significant. Thus, the probability of including a party in the
consideration set is positively affected by the fact a respondent voted this party in previous (1989)
elections.
Table 4 shows that the explanatory variables are also significant predictors for vote intention.
Again, the state-dependence parameter Æ is positive and significant. One of key parameters in
our models is . Its posterior mean indicates that if the absolute difference in the utilities of the
two most preferred options (including either two parties or a party and “no-vote”) is smaller than
0.39, the respondent indicates not to know which party to vote for. Although not shown, we note
that the posterior standard deviations decrease in the order of model D, C, B and A, where those
of the D-models are substantially smaller than those of the others.
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Table 5 shows the posterior mean and standard deviation of the covariance matrix  of the
multivariate probit model for the consideration set formation. Notably, the 95% confidence
interval for none of the off-diagonal elements covers the zero value. A positive (negative)
off-diagonal element indicates (non-) substitutability of political parties beyond that what the
covariates account for. Substitutes are, therefore, CDA and VVD (correlation = 0.20) and PvdA
and D’66 (correlation = 0.12). Non-substitutes are, for example, PvdA and VVD (correlation =
 0.15). The face validity of these findings is high given the Dutch political situation.
The four models and prediction methods are compared on their election forecasts. These are
calculated by averaging the posterior predictive probabilities over all individuals. Table 6 displays
for each of the models A through D the predicted aggregate election results (party shares). For
comparison, we give the true election results (derived from the actual choices in 1994). In the
final column we display mean squared forecast errors.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Table 6 shows that models D1 and D2 have the lowest squared errors across the five
alternatives. Second best is C, next B, and worst is A. Hence the most sophisticated models
perform best, and each of their components contribute to better predictions. Model B improves
on model A as it explicitly accounts for including individuals whose response is no-vote, do not
know, or do not want to say. On top of that, the use of state-dependence variables in model C
decreases the forecast error. And, if we finally add the consideration set stage as in model D, the
prediction becomes even better. It seems that the use of predicted consideration sets as in model
D1 is slightly better than the use of stated consideration sets (D2). Apparently, it is important to
allow for choices outside the stated consideration set, which is accommodated for in the forecasts
of the latter model.
As an aside, we note that all models underpredict PvdA’s share and all models overpredict
the share of D’66. Apparently, none of the models captures the switch from D’66-intention to
PvdA-vote, which is also visible in Table 2: 97 respondents make this switch. Factors external
to the models have caused this. Nevertheless, models D1 and D2 suffer the least. For these
two models we computed the posterior mean forecast hit-rates: the percentage of time the model
accurately predicts the actual vote across individuals in the sample. These are respectively 62.6%
and 61.7%, showing that the two models forecast the votes at the individual level quite well.
We depict in Figure 1 the marginal predictive posterior densities for each of the six parties
based on model D1. The posterior mass is quite concentrated around the mean.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
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Table 7 yields insight in the bivariate predictive distribution of the percentages for all six
options. In this table we present the variance-covariance matrix of models C and D1. It is
interesting to see how the exclusion of this stage affects the (co-)variances.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Table 7 shows that the variances of the predictions decrease for model D1 relative to model C
for all options except for the no-vote option. In addition, the covariance structure has changed in a
manner consistent with the pattern observed in Table 5. That is, the model with the consideration
set stage, model D1, has more “profiled” covariances, in that the covariances between party shares
converge to zero for non-substitutable parties, and become more negative for substitutable parties.
A strong example is CDA: in D1 relative to C, the covariance for CDA with non-substitutes such
as D’66 and PvdA becomes less negative, whereas the covariance with a substitute such as VVD
is more so. Similarly, VVD appears to be competing less with PvdA and D’66 in model D1
relative to C. We also note that PvdA and D’66 become less substitutable in D1. Apparently, these
two parties tend to be included jointly in the consideration set (positive covariance in Table 5),
but this affects the intention in the opposite direction. Thus, the inclusion of the consideration set
stage in the model enables the user to make more precise inferences on the competitive structure
in the political domain and to get better out-of-sample forecasts.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The prediction of outcomes of elections for political parties and candidates receives much interest
in democracies across the world, an interest that is reflected intensive media coverage. Forecasts
based on pre-election polls in addition have important political consequences, since they enable
parties and candidates to asses their relative strengths and weaknesses as input to campaign
strategy and coalition formation. In this paper we proposed a model for pre-election polling
data to predict election outcomes. The model is based on a utility framework and explicitly
accommodates consideration and choice stages of voting behavior. We find that the addition
of the consideration set stage improves predictive accuracy and strongly decreases the posterior
variance of the predictions. For the design of pre-election polls these results imply that it is
important to include a question on the party voted at the previous elections as well as questions
on the set of parties considered.
We find that the predictive capacity of the model is further improved by the inclusion of a
state-dependence variable accounting for previous voting behavior as an explanatory variable. A
final conclusion from our study is that it is important to account explicitly for “missing data”, that
12
is, for the responses “do not vote”, “do not know”, and “do not want to say”. Rather than imputing
those missing responses based on available procedures, we have postulated a plausible behavioral
mechanism for them that enables forecasts of votes of subjects in each of those categories. This
significantly adds to the predictive validity of our model.
Our study also has several caveats. One limitation is that the “other party” option includes
very heterogenous parties, whereas our model assumes that the explanatory variables affect the
choice for all parties within this set in the same way. However, we cannot split this set into all
the parties it consists of, because the response parameters would be unidentified due too few
observations. Further, we choose to concentrate on within-sample forecasts, but forecasts of all
procedures could also be projected to the population using weighting procedures. Further, we use
stated votes, assessed through telephone interviews after the election, as a forecasting benchmark.
Although we do believe that the bias in these stated votes is small, having the actual votes would
be preferrable. In spite of the fact that our model attained a high hit-rate of votes at the individual
level, it could not predict a swing in choice between two parties from intentions to actual votes.
Such a swing is caused by other factors than the demographic predictors used in our model, for
example the media coverage of the pre-election poll results itself. The development of models
to accommodate such effects is an important topic for future research. Finally, our model does
not account for heterogeneity in the response parameters across individuals. Unfortunately, this
is not possible as we have a vote intention at only one point in time. If we would have had access
to intention data at multiple points in time we could have studied the effect of heterogeneity on
the predictive performance and we could have modeled the trends in the vote intentions, which
could also lead to better prediction of swings in the vote share. We leave these issues for future
research.
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APPENDIX:
FULL CONDITIONAL POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS
In this appendix we provide a sketchy derivation of the full posterior distributions of the model
parameters and unobserved utilities, which are needed in the Gibbs sampler.
Sampling of C
i
Denote the vector of latent variables (utilities) for the consideration set by
C

i
= (C

i1
; : : : ; C

iJ
)
0
. The model for these latent variables can be written in matrix form as
C

i
= x
0
i
+ I
 1
i
[D
i
] + "
i
(A.1)
where I 1
i
[D
i
] is a J-dimensional vector containing 0/1 dummy variables describing the
state-dependence. The latent variables C
i
are truncated multivariate normally distributed. The
individual elements C
is
can be sampled from their full conditional distribution on truncated
regions:
C

is
jC

i; s
; ; ;; data 

normal on (0;1) if c
is
= 1
normal on ( 1; 0] if c
is
= 0;
(A.2)
for s = 1; : : : ; J and where C
i; s
= (C

i1
; : : : ; C

i;s 1
; C

i;s+1
; : : : ; C

iJ
)
0
, see also Geweke
(1991). For individuals who “do not want to say” which party/parties they consider, the latent
consideration set utilities can be sampled from their unrestricted distributions according to (A.1).
Sampling of  and  Model (A.1) can be seen as a multivariate regression model with
regression parameters  and . The full conditional posterior of  and  are therefore (matrix)
normal.
Sampling of  To sample  we note that
p(jC

i
; ; ; data) / (jC
i
; ; ; data)
= exp( 
1
2
I
X
i=1
(C

i
  x
0
i
  I
 1
i
[D
i
])
0
(C

i
  x
0
i
  I
 1
i
[D
i
])): (A.3)
As  is not an unrestricted covariance matrix (the diagonal elements are 1), the full conditional
distribution is not inverted Wishart. In fact the full conditional posterior distribution of  is not
standard. To sample  we use a sampler based on Basag and Green (1993). Loosely speaking,
this sampler switches the two steps in the Metropolis-Hasting sampler of Metropolis et al. (1953).
We first draw u from a uniform distribution on the interval [0; 1]. In the second step we keep
sampling candidate draws of the elements of  from a uniform distribution on the interval [ 1; 1]
until (new)=(old) > u. The advantage of the latter approach is that it always results in a new
drawing of , which is not the case for the Metropolis-Hasting sampler.
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Sampling of D
i
Denote the vector of unobserved utilities by D
i
= (D

i1
; : : : ; D

i;J+1
)
0 which
is generated by
D

i
= x
0
i
( 0) + I
 1
i
[D
i
]Æ + 
i
; (A.4)
where I 1
i
[D
i
] is a J + 1-dimensional vector containing 0/1 dummy variables describing the
state-dependence. Hence the full conditional posterior distribution of the vector of unobserved
utilities D
i
is truncated normal. To simplify notation we define the largest and second largest
utility in the consideration set as
D

i;max = max[D

ij
; j = 1; : : : ; J + 1jc
ij
= 1]
D

i;max 1 = max[D

ij
; j = 1; : : : ; J + 1 ^ j 6= maxjc
ij
= 1]:
(A.5)
Additionally, if want to sample the utility D
is
we need the largest and second largest utility in the
consideration set apart from utility D
is
D

i; s
= fD

ij
; j = 1; : : : ; s  1; s+ 1; : : : ; J jc
ij
= 1g
D

i;max
 s
= max[D

ij
; j = 1; : : : ; J + 1 ^ j 6= sjc
ij
= 1]
D

i;max
 s
 1
= max[D

ij
; j = 1; : : : ; J + 1 ^ j 6= max
 s
^ j 6= sjc
ij
= 1]:
(A.6)
To derive the full conditional posterior distributions, we consider three cases. The first
case concerns the utilities for d
i
= j observations for j  J + 1. We have to sample D
i
from a truncated multivariate distribution such that D
id
i
> D
is
for all s with c
is
= 1 and
D

id
i
  D

i;max 1 > . This can be done by sampling the separate elements of Di from their
full conditional posterior distribution
D

is
jD

i; s
; ; Æ;
; ; data 

normal on ( 1; D
id
i
  ) if s 6= d
i
normal on (D
i;max
 s
+ ;1) if s = d
i
:
(A.7)
The second case concerns the utilities corresponding to the d
i
= J + 2 observations. In that case
we have to sample D
i
from a truncated multivariate distribution such that D
i;max  D

i;max 1  .
This can again be done by sampling the elements of D
i
from their full conditional posterior
distribution, that is,
D

is
jD

i; s


normal on ( 1; D
i;max
 s
+ ] if D
i;max
 s
 D

i;max
 s
 1
 
normal on [D
i;max
 s
  ;D

i;max
 s
+ ] if D
i;max
 s
 D

i;max
 s
 1
> 
(A.8)
The final case concerns the utilities corresponding to the d
i
= J + 3 observations. In that case
we can sample the latent utilities for the parties in the consideration set according to (A.4).
Sampling of  and Æ Model (A.4) can be seen as a multivariate regression model with
regression parameters  and Æ. The full conditional posterior of  and Æ are therefore normal.
Note that one only has to consider the equations for which c
ij
= 1.
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Sampling of 
 To sample the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix 
 denoted by 

jj
for
j = 1; : : : ; J we use
p(

jj
j; Æ; data) / 1


j;j

j
exp( 
1
2

2
jj
I
X
i=1
I[c
ij
= 1](D

ij
  x
0
i

j
  I[d
 1
i
= j]Æ)
2
) (A.9)
and hence that
P
I
i=1
I[c
ij
= 1](D

ij
  x
0
i

j
  I[d
 1
i
= j]Æ)
2


2
jj
 
2
(
j
) (A.10)
with 
j
=
P
I
i=1
I[c
ij
= 1] for j = 1; : : : ; J .
Sampling of  To sample  we consider the maximum of the differences between the two
largest utilities of the “do not know” voters
lb = max[D

i;max  Di;max 1; i = 1; : : : ; Ijdi = J + 2] (A.11)
and the minimum of the difference between the two largest utilities of the voters and no voters
ub = min[D

i;max  Di;max 1; i = 1; : : : ; Ijdi  J + 1]: (A.12)
It is easy to see that the likelihood as a function of  is constant in the region between the two
values. Therefore, we can sample
  Unif(lb; ub): (A.13)
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
CDA D’66 PvdA VVD Other No Do not Do not Total
party vote know want
to say
j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4 j = 5 j = 7 j = 6 j = 8
Actual vote 1989 1093 535 1037 520 311 813 238 73 4620
Vote intention 1994 662 572 663 566 499 300 1289 69 4620
In consideration set 1994 1651 2123 1702 1458 1652 - - - -
Actual vote 1994 893 710 1113 774 663 467 0 0 4620
Vote intention 1994 crossed with explanatory variables
Looking Yes 7 23 29 15 29 11 69 1 184
for job No 655 549 634 551 470 289 1220 68 4436
Home Own house 406 331 290 390 244 120 676 38 2495
ownership Rental house 256 241 373 176 255 180 613 31 2125
Gender Female 362 280 332 259 245 147 784 38 2447
Male 300 292 331 307 254 153 505 31 2173
Dwelling Countryside 105 63 73 63 41 30 144 5 524
Urb. countryside 310 192 232 225 165 103 497 25 1749
Small town 154 174 209 148 158 93 369 16 1321
Large town 93 143 149 130 135 74 279 23 1026
Income Below modal 152 95 199 65 140 95 326 19 1091
Modal 272 199 270 177 199 144 589 31 1881
Above modal 238 278 194 324 160 61 374 19 1648
Age age34 173 210 166 151 179 118 459 16 1472
34<age54 209 284 261 253 198 89 497 24 1815
age>55 280 78 236 162 122 93 333 29 1333
Union FNV 59 137 202 46 93 44 222 9 812
membership CNV 66 29 16 24 19 7 74 1 236
Other 56 49 60 53 39 17 100 6 380
None 481 357 385 443 348 232 893 53 3192
238 means “do not recall”.
Table 2: Cross-tabulation of intended and actual vote
Actual vote June 1994
CDA D’66 PvdA VVD Other No Total
Party Vote
Vote intention CDA 499 45 32 34 28 24 662
April 1994 D’66 31 349 97 41 36 18 572
PvdA 13 28 538 9 27 48 663
VVD 42 30 13 443 19 19 566
Other 23 43 65 18 315 35 499
No vote 21 19 54 25 36 145 300
Do not know 253 193 290 192 191 170 1289
Do not want to say 11 3 24 12 11 8 69
Total 893 710 1113 774 663 467 4620
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Table 3: Posterior results MVP-part of the 2-stage model
posterior mean 
CDA D’66 PVDA VVD other
intercept -0.8016 -0.4950 -1.2280 -0.4969 -1.0090
job searcher -0.0675 0.1621 0.1136 -0.0822 0.1279
home owner 0.1904 -0.0256 -0.0039 0.2110 -0.0350
female 0.0566 -0.0803 0.0155 -0.0288 -0.0804
urbanisation -0.1001 0.0790 0.0391 -0.0244 0.0855
below modal 0.0476 -0.2463 0.2371 -0.4211 0.2724
modal 0.1413 -0.2118 0.0637 -0.1177 0.1283
young 0.1950 0.3810 0.2388 0.1328 0.3710
middle aged -0.0019 0.3786 0.2978 0.0163 0.2737
FNV member -0.4073 0.2140 0.2348 -0.3823 0.2255
CNV member 0.1513 -0.0432 -0.0176 -0.2238 0.2458
other union member 0.1025 0.1365 0.0838 -0.1952 0.0891
no vote (1989) 0.3692 -0.1372 0.4480 0.0797 0.0452
do not know (1989) 0.6086 -0.0362 0.4971 0.0818 0.2571
do not want to say (1989) 0.5401 0.1172 0.6780 0.3449 0.1905
posterior standard deviation 
intercept 0.0098 0.0079 0.0087 0.0091 0.0082
job searcher 0.0125 0.0107 0.0114 0.0129 0.0102
home owner 0.0024 0.0021 0.0022 0.0023 0.0020
female 0.0020 0.0016 0.0019 0.0018 0.0017
urbanisation 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
below modal 0.0043 0.0036 0.0041 0.0042 0.0038
modal 0.0027 0.0024 0.0026 0.0027 0.0024
young 0.0035 0.0029 0.0034 0.0035 0.0031
middle aged 0.0033 0.0026 0.0031 0.0031 0.0029
FNV member 0.0040 0.0029 0.0033 0.0034 0.0028
CNV member 0.0103 0.0082 0.0102 0.0093 0.0087
other union member 0.0061 0.0059 0.0060 0.0060 0.0054
no vote (1989) 0.0035 0.0033 0.0035 0.0034 0.0031
do not know (1989) 0.0090 0.0086 0.0089 0.0097 0.0086
do not want to say (1989) 0.0492 0.0477 0.0432 0.0512 0.0467
posterior mean  1.6980
posterior standard deviation  0.0009
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Table 4: Posterior results MNP-part of the 2-stage model
posterior mean 
CDA D’66 PVDA VVD other
intercept 1.2230 1.1630 1.2050 1.0170 1.1520
job searcher -0.4882 -0.2095 0.1897 0.0886 0.1515
home owner -0.0710 -0.0541 -0.0737 0.1019 0.0201
female -0.1518 -0.1730 -0.1703 -0.2645 -0.0591
urbanisation -0.1508 -0.1007 -0.0162 0.0505 0.0219
below modal -0.1636 -0.2827 -0.3505 -0.3840 -0.1994
modal -0.2521 -0.2660 -0.3496 -0.2946 -0.2785
young 0.0962 0.4956 -0.1364 0.1854 0.0219
middle aged 0.0191 0.2268 -0.2294 0.3358 -0.0674
FNV member -0.0372 0.0684 0.0594 -0.1129 -0.0217
CNV member 0.1834 0.3524 0.0961 -0.2046 -0.4478
other union member 0.0572 -0.0185 0.2953 0.2758 0.0506
no vote (1989) 0.7953 0.5509 0.9859 0.8285 0.6974
do not know (1989) -0.3833 -0.0476 -0.1202 -0.9143 -0.2858
do not want to say (1989) 0.1418 -1.4820 -0.4770 -0.8322 -1.0250
posterior standard deviation 
intercept 0.0573 0.0570 0.0595 0.0656 0.0651
job searcher 0.1158 0.0627 0.0601 0.0897 0.0610
home owner 0.0132 0.0108 0.0122 0.0154 0.0121
female 0.0113 0.0105 0.0116 0.0137 0.0117
urbanisation 0.0034 0.0031 0.0032 0.0037 0.0034
below modal 0.0254 0.0214 0.0240 0.0326 0.0243
modal 0.0149 0.0135 0.0178 0.0165 0.0176
young 0.0193 0.0228 0.0219 0.0220 0.0229
middle aged 0.0180 0.0204 0.0191 0.0223 0.0205
FNV member 0.0272 0.0166 0.0166 0.0289 0.0185
CNV member 0.0453 0.0583 0.0951 0.0762 0.0559
other union member 0.0493 0.0397 0.0455 0.0521 0.0518
no vote (1989) 0.0304 0.0213 0.0253 0.0253 0.0206
do not know (1989) 0.0477 0.0392 0.0472 0.0732 0.0413
do not want to say (1989) 0.3593 0.9197 0.2786 0.4626 0.3143
posterior mean Æ 1.4680
posterior standard deviation Æ 0.0020
posterior mean  0.388
posterior standard deviation  0.0001352
Note: For empirical identification we restrict 
 to be a J   1-dimensional identity matrix.
Table 5: Posterior results for  in MVP-part of the 2-stage
model
posterior mean 
CDA D’66 PvdA VVD other
CDA 1.0000 -0.0170 0.0899 0.1985 -0.1726
D’66 -0.0170 1.0000 0.1182 0.0505 0.0764
PvdA 0.0899 0.1182 1.0000 -0.1519 0.0237
VVD 0.1985 0.0505 -0.1519 1.0000 -0.2087
other -0.1726 0.0764 0.0237 -0.2087 1.0000
posterior standard deviation 
CDA D’66 PvdA VVD other
CDA 0.0000 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008
D’66 0.0009 0.0000 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006
PvdA 0.0009 0.0007 0.0000 0.0008 0.0007
VVD 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0000 0.0007
other 0.0008 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0000
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Table 6: Prediction results of total election for the four
models and fit statistics
Model CDA D’66 PvdA VVD other no vote sq. error
A 22.37 19.21 22.70 18.47 17.24 0 139.44
B 21.41 18.54 21.61 17.98 16.60 3.86 66.21
C 20.99 17.94 21.45 17.16 16.27 6.20 35.52
D1 20.67 17.98 21.21 16.44 15.47 8.24 21.75
D2 20.58 17.89 20.28 16.26 15.10 9.89 23.25
True value 19.33 15.37 24.09 16.75 14.35 10.11
Table 7: Covariance matrix of the predictions
Model C
CDA D’66 PvdA VVD other no vote
CDA 1.3510 -0.2797 -0.2002 -0.2096 -0.3246 -0.3369
D’66 -0.2797 1.1570 -0.2756 -0.1993 -0.1738 -0.2287
PvdA -0.2002 -0.2756 1.4390 -0.2414 -0.3118 -0.4101
VVD -0.2096 -0.1993 -0.2414 1.2560 -0.2817 -0.3234
other -0.3246 -0.1738 -0.3118 -0.2817 1.4370 -0.3451
no vote -0.3369 -0.2287 -0.4101 -0.3234 -0.3451 1.6440
Model D1
CDA D’66 PvdA VVD other no vote
CDA 1.1070 -0.2180 -0.0933 -0.2252 -0.1529 -0.4178
D’66 -0.2180 1.0870 -0.2405 -0.1319 -0.1901 -0.3070
PvdA -0.0933 -0.2405 1.2180 -0.2153 -0.2158 -0.4530
VVD -0.2252 -0.1319 -0.2153 0.9437 -0.1453 -0.2259
other -0.1529 -0.1901 -0.2158 -0.1453 1.1160 -0.4114
no vote -0.4178 -0.3070 -0.4530 -0.2259 -0.4114 1.8150
Note: The entries in this table should be multiplied with e-005.
Figure 1: Marginal predictive posterior densities of total election results
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